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Ethics in Government Act:
Report and Recommendations
Introduction
can

be

regulated. 6 1 Thus the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke

of

the need for civil

to

6

Morality can't

be

legislated, but

rights laws, and his

behavior

words apply equally

the need for ethics legislation.

on July 2, 1987, the New York State Legislature
the Ethics in Government Act (the

6

Ethics Act 6

)

passed

and the New

York

Governmental Accountability Audit and Internal Control Act, which
were signed

into

law on

legislation go into effect

August 7,

1987.

2

Provisions

at different times,

of

many as late

the
as

January 1, 1991.

1 ouoted in Preyer, #Legislative Ethics,w in Annual Chief
Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States,
Ethics and Government 67 (1982).
2

Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404
(S.6441, A.8528); New York Governmental Accountability Audit and
Internal Control Act of 1987, ch. 814, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1456.
The Audit Act confers additional powers upon the State
Comptroller within the State's accounting system; requires state
agencies to establish comprehensive internal controls; and
subjects the Offices of the Governor, Comptroller, and Attorney
General, as well as the Legislature and the Judiciary, to a
system of independent audits by certified public accounting firms
every two years.
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The Ethics
state

officers

and

Act

covers

employees,

employees (collectively,

statewide

elected

officials,

legislators,

and

legislative

"covered

individuals") and,
3
purposes, certain political party chairmen.

for

some

The Act, among other things, prohibits covered individuals and

political party

chairmen from

services on behalf of private
state agencies

with state

and political

the private

clients

of

before

and from engaging in various
.
4
agencies.
The Act does not

prohibit covered individuals
counselling

rendering

clients on certain matters

for compensation,

business transactions

appearing or

on

party chairmen
matters

from

before

state

agencies, nor does it in any way restrict appearances by

covered

individuals on behalf of private clients before political

subdi-

visions of the

State.

earns more than $30,000

The

Act also requires

in compensation from

any employee

who

the State, or

who

3

The Act also covers the judicial branch to the extent that
it requires the Chief Judge, in consultation with the
Administrative Board of the Courts, to approve a financial
disclosure form for use by all judges, justices, and court
officers and employees earning over $30,000. Ethics Act Section
17 (N.Y. Jud. Law§ 211(4)). The Administrative Board has
adopted the forms exactly as set forth in the Act. N.Y. Law
Journal, March 18, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
4

The Act is described in greater detail in the Appendix.
This Report and its Appendix do not attempt, however, to describe
all the details, exceptions, and ambiguities contained in the Act
and instead address the Act's general terms.
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holds a policy-making position, and political party chairmen,
file an

extensive

annual financial

disclosure

statement,

to
the

forms for which are set forth in the Act.

The Act is to be

enforced by three separate

one each for the legislative
political

subdivisions

commissions•).

of

agencies,

and executive branches and one
the

State

•ethics

(collectively,

These commissions may impose civil penalties

willful violations of certain provisions of the Act or may
them for criminal prosecution.
except upon referral by one
permit those who

for

No such prosecution is

of the agencies.

have filed deficient

correct them within
cies, and to correct

fifteen days after

•cure•

for
refer

permitted
provisions

disclosure statements
notice of the

other conduct proscribed

to

deficien-

by the Act.

The

Act also pre-empts the applicability of professional disciplinary
rules with respect to certain conduct expressly permitted by
Act.

the

5

5

certain provisions affect New York City, but the Act
otherwise applies only at the state level and does not cover the
State's political subdivisions, except that political
subdivisions having a population of more than 50,000 must adopt
their own financial disclosure forms by 1991, failing which the
forms set forth in the Act will automatically apply. It is
unclear on what basis political subdivisions of the State were
entirely excluded from coverage by the broader substantive
provisions of the Ethics Act. Small communities, no less than
large ones, must grapple with conflicts of interest issues. This
(Footnote Continued)
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*
While the
ethics laws,
troubling. 6

certain

*

*

Ethics Act

makes important

provisions

and

omissions

changes in
remain

deeply

The Act represents a significant step forward in the

regulation of inappropriate conduct by New York State
officials.

our

It is not a panacea

plague government in

New York

for all the ills that
State, but

it provides

government
currently
momentum

necessary for further improvements.

(Footnote Continued)
was made evident to the Commission when it undertook to gather
citizens' views of local and state ethical issues throughout New
York, and in investigations undertaken by the Commission. The
Commission is convinced of the need for ethical guidelines
applicable to all communities. Accordingly, the Commission is
examining existing local codes of ethics and will shortly submit
for public comment a preliminary draft ethics law for political
subdivisions of the State. But see N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law §§ 801,
802, 805-a, 806.
6

see, ~, Memorandum from Robert Abrams, Attorney General
of New York to Governor Cuomo at 6 (July 7, 1987) (wAbrams
Memow). See also Letter from Craig E. Polhemus, Counsel to the
New York State Office for the Aging to Evan Davis, Counsel to the
Governor (August 6, 1987) (wPolhemus Letterw); Memorandum from
Gilbert Harwood, Counsel to the Higher Education Services
Corporation to Evan Davis (August 3, 1987) (wHigher Education
Services Memow); Memorandum from Gails. Shaffer, New York State
Secretary of State to Evan Davis (July 23, 1987) cwsecretary of
State Memow); Memorandum from the New York State Bar Association
to Governor Cuomo (July 23, 1987) (wNYSBA Memow); Memorandum from
Gene Russianoff, New York Public Interest Research Group to Evan
Davis (July 3, 1987) (wNYPIRG Memow) (all contained in the
Governor's Bill Jacket for S.6441). This Report does not attempt
to address all the issues raised in these memoranda.
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Summary of Recommendations

The New York State
recommends amendments

to

Commission on Government

the Act

in

order to

Integrity

strengthen

its

effect on the conduct of New York State government officials

and

employees that might interfere with their public responsibilities
to the people of the

State.

Because ethical considerations

are

of equal concern to all branches of government, the Commission is
of the view that uniformity of treatment of all branches, consistent with

their functions,

integrity in government.

best

engenders public

7

and

The Commission therefore urges that the

legislature give further consideration to
Act applies disparately to

respect

the ways in which

the different branches.

7

In

the

keeping

see NYPIRG Memo, suora note 6. See also Letter of New York
State Common Cause to Gov. Mario M. Cuomo (April 10, 1987)
(contained in Governor's Bill Jacket on S.6441). For example,
there is a two year post-employment ban on state officers' and
employees' paid appearances before their own former agencies, as
well as a lifetime bar on appearing or rendering services before
any agency on matters in which they were •directly concerned and
in which [they] personally participated• or which were under
their •active consideration• during their government employment.
Ethics Act Section 2.8 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(8)). In
contrast, although former legislators are barred from compensated
lobbying for two years after their government service, former
legislative employees are barred, also from compensated lobbying,
only for the remainder of the term in which they served, and even
then only in regard to bills in which they were •directly
concerned and in which [they] personally participated.• Id.
Thus, legislative branch employees who leave on the last day of a
term may commence private lobbying activities at the start of the
(Footnote Continued)
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with

the

Commission's

mandate,

contained in this Report are
and legislative employees

however,

the

recommendations

limited in the case of

to the question

legislators

of their

appearances

before state agencies and political subdivisions of the State.

Based upon
dence with

investigations, interviews

private

individuals

and

public

and

correspon-

officials,

comparative study of the laws and regulations of other

and

a

jurisdic-

tions, the Commission recommends that:

1.

Covered

individuals

should

completely

be

barred from making appearances, rendering services, and
counselling

on

matters

before

private clients, whether or

state

agencies

for

not for compensation

(pp.

14-18);

2.

Covered

individuals

should

be

completely

barred from making appearances, rendering services, and
counselling on matters before political subdivisions of
the State

for

private

clients, whether

or

not

compensation (pp. 18-20);

(Footnote Continued)
next term, perhaps within days, even on matters in which they
were directly and personally involved.

for
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Executive

3.

should

be

branch

required

participating in

to

officers

disqualify

official

and

employees

themselves

action that

is

from

likely

to

affect their particular personal financial interests in
a manner

different from

those of

the general

public

(pp. 20-22) ;

4.

The Act's referral mechanism for

prosecution

of violations should be repealed, and *cure* provisions
should be expressly limited to allow correction only of
unintentional violations of the Act (pp. 22-28);

5.

The Act's pre-emption of professional

plinary codes and

other regulations governing

disciethical

conduct should be repealed (pp. 28-34); and

6.

The

coverage

provisions should
promulgated by the

be

of

the

financial

modified; the

forms

disclosure
should

administering agencies; and

tion provisions should be modified (pp. 34-39).

be

exemp-
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Values Reflected in
Conflicts of Interest Regulations
In order
first considered

to evaluate

the Ethics

Act, the

Commission

the competing

values and

tensions that

arise

when private citizens hold public office.

The evil ... [of conflicts of interest] is risk
of impairment of impartial judgment, a risk
which arises whenever there is temptation to
serve personal interests.
The quality of
specific results is immaterial .... Like other
fiduciaries, such as guardians, executors,
lawyers, and agents, the public trustee has a
duty to avoid private interests which cause
even a risk that he will not be motivated
solely by the interests of the beneficiaries
of his trust. Properly conceived. conflictof-interest regulation does not condemn bad
actions so much as it erects a system designed to protect a decision-making process.
It is preventive and prophylactic. Its aim
is not detection and punishment of evil, but
providing safeguard~ which lessen the risk of
undesirable action.

The oft-stated

principle that

•a public

off ice is

public trust• suggests that those who act as public officers

8

a
are

The Association of the Bar of the City of New York Special
Committee on Congressional Ethics, Congress and the Public Trust
39 (1970) (emphasis added).
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fiduciaries.

Conflicts of interest

cials face an overlap

arise when government

of their public

interests: for example,

duties and their

when they or

represent private clients,

their business

offiprivate

associates

particularly before government

agen-

cies, or when they have business interests that are regulated

or

otherwise affected by their decisions as officials of government.
Although conflicts
personal or

can

also

arise when

non-pecuniary interests

duties, it would

be impossible

public

at odds

to control

servants

with their
all these

have
public

conflicts

through legislation.

Economic interests are more appropriately made
to uniform regulation.

Even then, inherent conflicts that

when a government

official is affected

by government

which affect

all

other

taxpayers

obviously be

tolerated.

homeowners or
Government

especially, it is

life.

In the

enable

constituents

candidate will

be sensitive

to

decisions
must

officials necessarily

have

inevitable

case of elected

often a candidate's

interests that

arise

equally

private interests like all other citizens; this is an
and beneficial fact of

subject

officials

personal experiences
to

determine

their specific

and

whether

and
the

legitimate

needs and interests.

Thus, however

desirable it

might

seem to

avoid

pecuniary conflicts of interest and the appearance of them,

all
this
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goal is nearly
local law

impossible to

touches nearly

attain.

every aspect

Some

federal, state,

of our

personal

particularly our business and financial transactions.
serve government

on a

part-time basis,

or who

or

lives,

Those

have income

who
or

business interests outside of their government activity, or whose
family members have

such interests, are

necessarily faced

all manner of real or potential conflicts.

As public sensitivity

9

to ethical

standards of

servants has increased, there has been a tendency to assume
it is

necessary

to

impose

ever

more

prohibiting all conceivable conflicts.

with

stringent

public
that

requirements

But the burdens on public

servants must be taken into account, lest we discourage a significant number

of honest, competent, and well-intentioned individ-

uals from participating in government.

9

see Congress and the Public Trust, supra note 8, at 44.
These issues generally arise to a much lesser extent for members
of the judicial branch, where stringent conflict-of-interest
rules already obtain. See, ~' Code of Judicial Conduct,
Canons 3.C(l) (c), 5.C. In addition, the New York Judiciary Law
provides that a judge shall be disqualified from taking part in
the decision of any action or proceeding *in which he has been
attorney or counsel, or in which he is interested.* N.Y. Jud.
Law § 14.
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In a study

for the American

Public Research, Alfred

S. Neely IV

Enterprise Institute
describes with

intentional

irony the conflict-free public servant:
The ideal public servant should have no
personal financial needs that the rewards he
receives in return for his service cannot
satisfy. There should be no need for parttime jobs to supplement his public income.
And he should have no financial interests
that might present conflicts. His personal
finances should be simple. What he brings to
government or accumulates while there should
be invested in nothing more flamboyant than
U.S. savings bonds.
Naturally the ideal public servant must
come from somewhere, but it is preferable if
he comes to the government directly after
graduation from the educational system.
He
will then not carry with him any baggage of
potential conflicts
arising
from
prior
employment and experience.
Moreover, the
ideal public servant should have no desire or
opportunity to move out of government service
for any reason other than retirement or
death.
.

Thifi

ideal

obviously

does

not

ex-

1st . ...

Thus, Mr. Neely concludes:
.•• [E]thics-in-government laws reflect
one set of significant and worthwhile values.
In great measure they serve to develop and
protect public confidence in the integrity of
government. It is important to note that
present ethics-in-government laws do
not
attempt to achieve the highest conceivable
standards. They are not unbending but reveal

6

10
A. Neely, Ethics-in-Government Laws:
Ethical 6 ? 53 (1984).

for

Are they Too
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a degree of pragmatism and compromise in
response to the exigencies as ~ell as the
aspirations of good government. 1
The Commission
how can

we best

has thus

regulate the

administer the law so as
without discouraging

grappled with

behavior of

the

those who

to protect the integrity of

qualified

citizens from

question:
make

and

government

participating

in

public service?

There are

four common

methods

used in

conflicts

of

interest laws to avoid real or apparent conflicts:
government officials may be prohibited from
engaging in certain economic relationships;
they may be required to disqualify themselves from
participating in government action that might affect
their interests;
they may be required to disclose their financial
interests, thus giving the public an opportunity to
judge the propriety of their actions;
they may be required to divest themselves of
interest which may cause a conflict.

any

Each of

by

the

and

the

Commission in

llid.

these

balancing

methods

has

the interests

been
of

considered
the public
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private financial

interests of

York's new Ethics Act.

government officials

under

New

Report on the Ethics Act
April 6, 1988
Page 14
Recommendations

The Ethics Act

should be amended

as set forth

below.

These recommendations are intended to describe the objectives
proposed amendments to the Act;

they are not phrased to

of

suggest

specific statutory language.

1.
covered individuals should be completely barred
from making appearances,
rendering services,
and
for
counselling on matters before state agencies
private clients, whether or not for compensation.

The Ethics Act

bars appearances and

services for compensation relating to
agency involving six broad areas:
or lease

of real

property,

therefor, involving any

the rendition

any matter before a

of

state

(i) the purchase, sale, rental,

goods or

such agency;

services, or

a

contract

(ii) rate-making

proceed-

ings; (iii) the adoption or repeal of rules or regulations having
the force of law;

(iv) obtaining grants of

licensing; and (vi) proceedings
The Act thus
chairmen from
purposes. 12

money or loans;

relating to certain

prohibits covered individuals
appearing

before

12
see Ethics Act Section 2.7(a) (i-vi)
73(7)(a)).

franchises.

and political

most state

agencies

(v)

for

party
most

(N.Y. Pub . Off. Law§
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Some proceedings, however,
trative and criminal
the Act.

including certain

investigatory matters, are

not covered

For example, the Act would permit a covered

to represent a

taxpayer in

nations concerning
made before the

Division of Tax Appeals,

determi-

These challenges

Conciliation and
of the Department

by

individual

challenging administrative

tax deficiencies.

Bureau of

adminis-

may

be

Mediation, and

the

of Taxation and

Fi-

nance.

Government employees' representation of private parties
before

public

agencies

inevitably

impropriety and the risk

an

appearance

that even the best-intentioned

by the agencies will be impaired
sures.

creates

actions

by the presence of undue

pres-

These appearances may compromise the impartiality of

government

employees'

decisions could

decision-making

affect

personal interests.

their

Many

significant control over the

because

clients', and

government

their

hence

the

official

their

own,

also

exercise

budgets and operations of

adminis-

trative and regulatory agencies.

employees

of

Their appearances before

those

agencies can lead to abuses of power, including coerced or biased
decision-making by the agency in favor of the government
ees' clients,

or possible

retaliation by

government

employemployees
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.
against

t he

f

agency

or

un f avora bl e

official before whom government

13
d ec1s1ons.
. .

An

agency

employees appear may respond

to

perceived wundue influencew even when none is intended.

Thus, while
restricts

covered

it

is

commendable that
compensated

individuals'

rendition of services

on matters before

confidence in government integrity
served by a

total prohibition

private clients
influence.

that

might

the

Ethics

Act

appearances

and

state agencies,

public

would be enhanced and

better

on all appearances
raise even

the

on behalf

spectre

of

of

undue

Indeed, heads of certain agencies have publicly urged

that all appearances before

their agencies, including some

are not now covered by the Act, be prohibited.
recommends that

all appearances

14

and rendition

The

that

Commission

of services

for

whatever purposes before state agencies by covered individuals on
behalf of private clients be barred.

13

see Reeves, Leaislators As Private Attorneys: The Need
For Legislative Reform, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 1052, 1056-59 (1983).
14

see Abrams Memo, supra note 6 at pages 1-2; Letter of
Roderick G.W. Chu, Commissioner of Taxation and Finance,
President, State of New York Tax Commission, to the Honorable
Mario M. Cuomo (July 17, 1987) (wTax Memow) pp. 1-2. At least as
early as 1964, the Legislature's Special Committee on Ethics
recommended wthat members of the Legislature and legislative
employees be prohibited from practicing or appearing before most
state agencies for compensation.w Report of the Special
Committee on Ethics (March 1964) at page 4.
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Nor does the Act prohibit uncompensated
of private clients before
The Act should be

state agencies in most

amended to prohibit

representation
circumstances.

this practice by

covered

individuals. The appearance of undue influence and the possibility of undue pressure on state agencies, even if unintended, is no
less present
.

because

compensa t ion.

a

internal research and
Such

barred.

is

not

accepting

15

In addition,

cies.

government employee

the

Act

now

expressly

discussion on matters

unpaid counselling

The legislature has

for

permits

before state

private clients

taken only the

ling would

erect a

public servant

complete

and the

agen-

should

first step to

tance covered individuals from inappropriate contacts by
iting certain personal appearances.

unpaid

be
dis-

prohib-

Prohibiting private counsel-

barrier between

interests of

matters pending before state agencies.

the duties

private clients

of

who

a

have

Allowing private counsel-

ling on matters before state agencies creates the impression that
a client is still getting

special benefits by virtue of

contact

with a covered individual.

This is especially so if the

covered

15

Nothing in the Act prohibits -- or should prohibit -- a
legislator (or legislative employee acting on his or her behalf)
from advocating any position in any matter in the legislator's
official capacity, whether or not on behalf of a constituent.
Ethics Act Section 2.7(d) (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(7) (d)).
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individual's law partner or

business associate makes the

actual

appearance before the state agency on behalf of the client.

A total

bar, including

rendition of services,

a bar

on unpaid

and counselling on

appearances,

matters before

state

agencies for private clients would help set to rest any suspicion
that a

covered individual's

client enjoys

an unfair

advantage

over other members of the public.

2.
Covered individuals should be completely barred
renderinq services,
and
from makinq appearances,
counsellinq on matters before political subdivisions
of the state for private clients, whether or not for
compensation.
The Ethics Act prohibits certain appearances by covered
individuals before state agencies,
appearances before political
should be

no such

but does not prohibit

subdivisions of

distinction.

The

the State.

same reasoning

their
There

supporting

restrictions on appearances before state agencies compels similar
restrictions on appearances before all political subdivisions
the State.

Covered individuals ought not to appear before

governments on behalf

of private clients

of

local

when the decisions

of

the covered individuals inevitably affect those governments. 16

16

Mayor Koch supports such a bar and has stated that the
Ethics Act prohibition •should be broadened to bar state officers
{Footnote Continued)
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Commission interviews

with

a number

of

current

former local officials have confirmed the view that, at the
least, an wappearancew problem

and
very

exists whenever a state

official

contacts local government agencies on behalf of private

clients.

Regardless of the ultimate outcome, there is always the possibilofficial.

One

interviewee pointed out that New York City and its agencies

rely

heavily on appropriations

City

ity

of

whas a
year.

pressure

inappropriate

big casew

a

from Albany,

pending before

Thus, a legislator's request

of a private client

on

local

and that

the Albany

New York

legislature

to a local agency on

should be considered

behalf

as impermissible as

judge's request for a favor from a lawyer who has a case
before the judge.

every

a

pending

17

Officials in smaller political subdivisions face equal,
if not greater, pressure to
at the state level to
believes, therefore,

please one who might have

benefit their localities.
that

the prohibition

The

against

influence
Commission
appearances

(Footnote Continued)
and employees from appearing before local government agencies,
where they may also exercise or appear to exercise undue
influence.w Letter, Mayor Edward I. Koch to Governor Mario M.
Cuomo (April 15, 1987).
17

canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct prohibits a
variety of extra-judicial activities, including judges' business
transactions with persons likely to come before them, in order to
minimize the risk of conflict with their official duties.
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should extend to those by covered individuals before all

politi-

cal subdivisions of the State and their agencies, not just before
agencies of the State itself.

3.
Executive branch officers and employees should be
required to disqualify themselves from participating in
official action that is likely to affect their personal
financial interests in a manner different from those of
the general public.

The Ethics Act does
government employee

in the

not require disqualification of
event that

the employee's

duties conflict with personal financial interests.

a

official

18

18 section 74 of the Public Officers Law, a precatory
provision that contains New York's •code of Ethics,• does suggest
that government employees should not engage in transactions as
representatives of the State with businesses in which they have
financial interests, and that they should abstain from making
personal investments when they have reason to believe that those
investments might be directly involved in decisions to be made by
them. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 74(3) (e), (g). This is consistent
with the notion that state officials and employees and
legislators and legislative employees should regard their
personal financial interests as subordinate to their
responsibility to uphold the public trust. They should be
sensitive to the possibility that any given business transaction
might be viewed as creating a potential conflict, and only if it
is unlikely to do so should they enter into the transaction.
Ethical Consideration 8-8 of the Lawyer's Code of
Professional Responsibility similarly discourages attorneys
holding public office from entering into transactions that
•foreseeably may• create a conflict with the proper discharge of
their public duties.
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The clearest conflicts of
ment officials, or

interest arise when

their families or

govern-

business associates,

have

interests in private entities that do business with, are regulated by, or are otherwise directly affected financially by

actions

of the

obvious

agencies they

economic

relationships

work with.

There are

which

impair

may

also less
a

public

ability to perform an official duty impartially.
public official

who receives

an

outside salary

servant's

For example,
from,

a

accepts

gifts or honoraria from, holds investments in, owes a debt to, or
is a

director or

officer in

an entity

affected by

government

action may face a conflict.

A government employee should

not take official

action

that might be influenced by personal financial interests, and one
who does

should be

subject to

sanctions.

Disqualification

cases of such conflict should be mandatory to protect the
from biased decision-making.
Such prohibitions
19
states,
as well as at the federal leve1. 20

19s ee,

exist in

in

public
other

.. Rev. Stat. § 84-14(a) {1985); La. Rev.
Hawaii
Stat. Ann. § 42:1112{C) (West 1965); Md. Ann. Code art. 40A, §
3-lOl(a) {1986); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 4:1700(72) (7) (Callaghan
1985) (Mich. Comp. Laws§ 15.342(7)).
20
18 u.s.c. § 208 (1987). Under this statute, a government
official who does not give notice of a personal conflict and
obtain prior written approval for continued participation in a
{Footnote Continued)
~'
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New York should accordingly require disqualification of
government employees from

taking official action

on matters

in

which they have personal financial interests different from those
of the general public.

4.
The Act's referral mechanism for prosecution of
violations should be repealed, and *cure* provisions
should be expressly limited to allow correction only of
unintentional violations of the Act.

There are serious deficiencies

in the Act's

enforce-

ment provisions which require reappraisal and improvement.

(a)
If

The Referral Mechanism for
Criminal Penalties Should be Repealed.
an

individual

knowingly

and

intentionally

(or

willfully) violates the conflict of interest or financial disclosure provisions of

the Ethics

Act, the

jurisdiction over the offender can

ethics commission

with

assess a civil penalty of

to ten thousand dollars. 21

(Footnote Continued)
matter may be fined, imprisoned, or both. See United States v.
Irons, 640 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1981).
21 Eth'1CS Act §§ 2.6, 2.14, 3.4 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§
73(6),(14), 73-a(4)).

up
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The Act further provides, however, that the commissions
may, in lieu

of the

civil penalty,

appropriate prosecutor and

there can

be

but only

shall be punishable

Thus, if there
no

violation wto

upon ... conviction,

such referral, such violation
. d emeanor. #22
mis

refer a

if

after

as a class

is no administrative

criminal prosecution--even

the

A

referral,

the

violation

constitutes a crime, and even if facts supporting prosecution are
uncovered by a separate and independent investigation.

The Commission is aware of

no other state that

tions prosecution for violation of its ethics laws upon
. . t ra t.ive agency. 23
o f an a d minis

ity of remedies

referral

In addition, the mutual exclusiv-

places the ethics

commissions in the

position of choosing between a certain, but possibly
civil sanction and an

condi-

uncertain, but possibly more

anomolous
inadequate,

appropriate,

criminal prosecution.

22 rd.
23

(emphasis added).

For example, sanctions of fine and/or imprisonment
provided in the Maryland Public Ethics Law are not contingent
upon commission action. Md. Ann. Code art. 40A §7-102 (1986).
Virginia specifically provides that violations of its Ethics Law
6
may be prosecuted notwithstanding the jurisdiction of, or any
pending proceeding before, the House or Senate Ethics Advisory
Panel. 6 Va. Code § 2.1-639.61 (1987)
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By providing that a violation of the Ethics Act may
prosecuted as a misdemeanor only

after commission referral to

be
a

prosecutor, the Act substantially dilutes the purpose of independent prosecutorial agencies.

24

Further, violations

of some

the provisions of Section 73 of the Public Officers Law that
affected by the new

referral mechanisms were already

as misdemeanors under prior
kind. 25 This effective

law, and without

withdrawal of

of
are

punishable

a referral of

independent discretion

any
to

24 see Letter from Robert M. Morgenthau on behalf of the
District Attorneys Association of New York to Gov. Mario M. Cuomo
(July 15, 1987) (wD.A.'s Letterw); Abrams Memo, supra note 6, at
pages 2-3; Higher Education Services Memo, supra note 6, at page
2; Polhemus Letter, supra note 6, at page 1; NYSBA Memo, supra
note 6, at page 2.
25 N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(10) (old law). The prior law and
the new law have many similar prohibitions. Compare N.Y. Pub.
Off. Law§ 73(2)-(5), (7) (old law) with Ethics Act Section 2
(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73). In both laws, subdivision (2)
prohibits a state officer or employee from receiving a contingent
fee for an appearance before a state agency; subdivision (3)
prohibits state officers from appearing against the State for
compensation in the Court of Claims; subdivision (4) prohibits a
political party chairman or a state official from selling goods
to the State or contracting with the State unless the contract is
awarded after notice and competitive bidding; and subdivision (5)
prohibits a state officer from accepting anything of value which
may influence that officer's actions. Subdivision (7) of the
prior law, retained and renumbered as subdivision (8) in the new
law, prohibits a state officer from appearing before the agency
with which that officer was associated for two years after
leaving office. Knowing and intentional violations of any of
these provisions was a misdemeanor under the prior law. N.Y.
Pub. Off. Law§ 73 (10) (old law); see also Abrams Memo, supra,
note 6, at page 4; People v. Zambuto, 73 A.D.2d 828, 423 N.Y.S.2d
770 (4th Dep't 1979). In addition, N.Y. Penal Law§§ 200.30 &
(Footnote Continued)
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prosecute violations of

the Ethics Act

may well be

unconstitu-

1 . 26
.
t iona

Whether or

not it

is unconstitutional,

the

referral

mechanism sends a wholly inappropriate message to the citizens of
this State.

It

feeds every citizen's

worst fear:

that

public

(Footnote Continued)
200.35 prohibit gifts to public officials for the performance of
official duties. N.Y. Penal Law§ 175.45 provides that a person
issuing a false financial statement with intent to defraud is
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. N.Y. Penal Law § 173.35
provides that a person #offering a false instrument for f ilingw
with intent to defraud the State is guilty of a Class E felony.
26 The New York Constitution provides:
The power of the grand juries to inquire
into the wilful misconduct in off ice of
public officers, and to find indictments or to direct the filing of
informations in connection with such
inquiries, shall never be suspended or
impaired by law.
N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6. Administrative referral as a condition
precedent to a district attorney's prosecution may violate these
provisions. See, ~' D.A.'s Letter, supra note 24; Letter from
Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney of Kings County, to
Governor Mario M. Cuomo (July 24, 1987); see also Abrams Memo,
supra note 6; NYPIRG Memo, supra note 6.
By contrast, Senator Warren M. Anderson, a sponsor of the
Ethics Act, defends the constitutionality of the referral
mechanism as •well within [the legislature's) power to define or
redefine the misdemeanor violations•. Letter of Warren M.
Anderson to John D. Feerick (December 7, 1987) (•Anderson
Letter•) at page 3. Moreover, if the referral provision were to
be found unenforceable, Senator Anderson concludes that •the
entire misdemeanor provisions should be unenforceable unless and
until the Legislature enacts a new law to replace them.w Id.
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officials have

something to

hide

and intend

to hide

it.

As

Justice Brandeis stated:
Our government is the potent, the omnipresent, teacher.
For good 9r for ill, it teaches the whole people by its
example. 2
The government should not

teach that private

citizens

are subject to the inquiries of an independent prosecutor,

while

those who hold government office are not.

(b)

The Act's cure Provisions Should be Clarified to
Apply Only to Unintentional Violations.

The Ethics Act provides a 15-day period during which
covered individual who is
cure any *deficiency•
deficiency is cured, no
never publicly

in possible violation

in a

undefined opportunity

financial disclosure

action is taken,

disclosed.

of the Act

The Act

for •any

violation• to be •rectified•. 28

also

form.

If

and the deficiency
seems to

potential conflict

provide
of

a
may
the
is
an

interest

It is unclear whether these cure

provisions pre-empt criminal or civil sanction in the event

that

the violations are intentional.

27

olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
28
Ethics Act Sections 7.11 & 12, 9.10 & 11, 16.11 & 12 (N.Y.
Exec. Law§§ 94(11) & (12), N.Y. Legis. Law§§ 80(10) & (11),
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§§ 813(11) & (12)).
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In testimony before the Commission, Governor Cuomo
his Counsel expressed

the view

pre-empts further action only

that the

15-day cure

provision

in cases involving inadvertent

innocent infractions, not willful violations, of the Act. 29
another plausible reading of

and

this section as

or
Yet,

enacted is that

a

cure pre-empts any further action in all cases, or that a willful
violation is, by definition, only

one that the violator

refuses

to cure. New York County District Attorney Morgenthau, writing on
behalf of the District Attorneys Association of New York,

inter-

prets the Ethics Act to permit a complete cure in every case, and
objects to it on that ground:

wNo other law permits a

such an opportunity to undo his crime with full

violator

confidentiality.

The result is that serious misconduct will go unpunished.w 30

Clearly, one who has been

guilty of a wwillful

viola-

tion" ought not to be given any grace period to cure the unlawful
behavior after notice from

an oversight agency.

The

Commission

29

see transcript of proceedings before the Commission on
September 9, 1987, at pages 5-6. See also Anderson Letter, supra
note 26 (to like effect).
30

D.A.'s Letter, supra note 24, at page 2. The
administrative procedures for notice and opportunity to cure are
confidential under the Ethics Act, so that the public cannot
monitor the proceedings. Ethics Act Sections 7.12(a), 9.ll(a),
16.12(a) (N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(12) (a), N.Y. Legis. Law§
80(1l)(a), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813(12)(a)).
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recommends that the Ethics Act
that procedures

and

penalties

be amended to provide
for willful

explicitly

violations

of

the

Ethics Act are not pre-empted by the cure provisions.

s.
The Act's pre-emption of professional disciplinary
codes and other requlations governing ethical
conduct should be repealed.
The Ethics Act pre-empts the application of professional disciplinary rules under certain circumstances.

31

It provides

that former legislators and legislative employees are not subject
to wany provision of the judiciary law, the education law, or any
other law or disciplinary rule 6

in regard to conduct

authorized

by the revolving door provisions of the Act.

The same exemption from professional disciplinary rules
applies to appearances and the rendition of services before state
agencies by members of firms, associations, and corporations that
are affiliated with

present or former

political party chairmen), as

covered individuals

long as these individuals

receive

no revenues from these matters.

31

Ethics Act Section 2.ll(a) & (c)

73 (11) (a)

&

(c)).

(and

(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §
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This provision of the

Act effectively insulates

those

who fall within its purview from the reach of existing and future
ethical codes of professional conduct to which they would
wise be

answerable.

estate brokers,

Affected groups

include

accountants, engineers,

other-

attorneys,

architects, and

real
health

professionals.

With respect to attorneys, the pre-emption provision
withdraws from the New York State courts the power to
lawyers for conduct

proscribed by the

.
1 Responsi'b 1' l 1' t y. 32
siona

Lawyer's Code of

It is
. impor
.
t an t

32

Profes-

t o no t e th a t th e

makes no distinction between attorneys in and out of
Indeed, the American

discipline

Bar Association considered

Cd
o e

government.

and rejected

The Code, which governs the ethical conduct of members of
the bar of the State of New York, appears as an Appendix to the
New York Judiciary Law and has been incorporated by reference by
each Appellate Division in the State in its respective rule
defining professional misconduct. 22 N.Y.C.R.R. 603.2, 691.2,
806.2, 1022.17.
A substantial violation of the Code may constitute grounds
for censure, suspension, or removal of an attorney from the
practice of law in New York, pursuant to N.Y. Jud. Law§ 90(2).
See In Re Connelly, 18 A.D.2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1st Dep't
1963). The Judiciary Law, in turn, acknowledges that an
attorney's professional conduct is uniquely regulated by the
courts, of which the attorney is an officer. In Re Cohen, 7
N.Y.2d 488, 166 N.E.2d 672, 199 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1960), aff'd, 366
U.S. 117 (1961).
The pre-emption provision of the Act has been severely
criticized by the New York State Bar Association. See NYSBA
Memo, supra note 6, at pages 4, 6-7.

a
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proposal of the

National Association of

Attorneys General

that

the conflict-of-interest sections of the Code's proposed

succes-

sor, the Model Rules, be made inapplicable to lawyers in

govern-

.

men t service.

33

Among the principles espoused

in the Code

potentially

implicated by the Act are the following:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a
matter in which the lawyer had substantial iesponsibil3
ity while he or she was a public employee.
A lawyer who holds public off ice shall not use his
or her public position to influence, or gttempt to
3
influence, a tribunal in favor of a client.
A lawyer who is a public official should
engage in personal or professional activitijg that
conflict with the lawyer's official duties.

not
may

A lawyer shall not accept professional employment
if the exercise of his or her professional judgment on
behalf of a client may be affected by the lawyer's 9wn
financial, business, property or personal interest. 3

33

See Josephson & Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer
Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients Are in Conflict?, 29 How. L.
J. 539, 557 n.86 (1986).
34
35
36
37

DR 9-lOl(B).
DR 8-lOl(A) (2).
EC 8-8.
DR 5-lOl(A).
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If a lawyer must decline employment on the grounds
that representation of one client may impair the
lawyer's judgment with respect to another, then no
partner or associate of the lawyer, or of the 38 lawyer's
firm, may accept or continue such employment.
A lawyer shall not accept compensation for legal
services from someone other t~~n his or her client,
except by the client's consent.

that the

To the Commission's knowledge,

this is the first

legislature

history

in

its

200-year

has

time

expressly

superseded the disciplinary power of the courts, and the occasion
for

the

departure

oversight

is

authority

claiming to enhance
skepticism.

particularly

from

an

ill-chosen.

independent

government ethics can

court

Withdrawing
system

only engender

while
public

Indeed, as with the prosecutorial referral mechanism

described above, the Commission is aware of no other state
effectively exempts
existing laws and
disapproves the

covered

individuals

disciplinary codes.
withdrawal

of

organizations to impose standards
that may be

more stringent

legislature.

38 DR 5-105(0).
39
DR 5-107(A) (1).

the

from

compliance

The Commission
authority

of

with

strongly

professional

of conduct upon their

than those deemed

which

members

desirable by

the
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With respect to the

underlying question whether

firms

should be vicariously disqualified by the Act itself, the Commission is

persuaded that

the

Act's prohibitions

on

appearances

before state agencies, coupled with the broadening of these
as specified in the Commission's Recommendation 1,
both the reality and the appearance of conflicts .
further recommends, however, that

40

will

bars
reduce

The Commission

the Act's approach to

limita-

tions on appearances stand only on an experimental basis and that
the legislature
effective date

revisit this
of

the Act.

issue within

41

At

one year

that time,

the

after

the

legislature

40 see supra pp. pages 14-18.
41

'
'
' h ard D. Emery d issen
'
t s and expresses th e
Commissioner
Ric
following views: The prohibition on covered individuals
appearing before state or municipal agencies should apply to
their law or business associates as well. The impropriety, or
appearance of impropriety, which occurs when a public official or
employee appears before a state or local agency on behalf of a
private client is no less when the partner of the public official
or employee does so. Traditionally, attorneys have been barred
by ethics codes from serving two masters and, when they are
barred, their partners have been as well. The duty of a
legislator to constituents is at least as compelling as that of a
lawyer to a client, and the two should never be allowed to
conflict. When partners of legislators represent clients before
state or municipal agencies, the legislator's duty to
constituents is compromised.
While such a rule might require legislators or their staff
members not to join, or to resign from, large law or other
professional firms, that would be an acceptable price to pay to
avoid the chilling effect on government decision-makers when
powerful legislators' partners are seeking to influence their
decisions. Twenty-five percent of the members of both houses of
the legislature combined are attorneys.
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should determine, in

light of the

sures made under the Act, 42

new prohibitions and

disclo-

whether the prohibitions on

appear-

ances before state agencies should be extended to firms, associations, and

corporations affiliated

with covered

individuals.

It may be, for example, that the presence of a legislator's
on the letterhead of
appearance of

the firm is alone

conflict

or

even-handed administration
legislature should

not

cause the
of

sufficient to create
citizenry

government.

hesitate

to

impose

In

43

name
an

to

doubt

the

that

case,

the

requirements

more

stringent than those contained in professional rules; but in

any

event the

the

legislature should

not interfere,

as it

has in

42

Ethics Act Section 8 (N.Y. Exec. Law§ 166) provides that
state regulatory agencies must keep public records of attorneys,
agents, and representatives who appear before them #for ... a
feew. The Commission recommends that this section be amended to
require records of uncompensated, as well as compensated,
appearances (see supra Recommendation 1). that this information
be maintained in a useful form, and that it be given appropriate
public dissemination.
43

Establishment of a full-time legislature would be one way
in which to avoid conflicts of interest and the appearance of
them, particularly those conflicts resulting from the dealings of
legislators' law partners and business associates with state
agencies. The Commission, however, takes no position on such a
major change in New York State government. The Commission
understands that this issue has been committed to the wpay
Commission# recently appointed by Governor Cuomo.
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pre-emption provision of the Act, with minimum ethical
imposed by professional organizations on their members.

standards
44

6.
The coverage of the financial disclosure provisions should be modified; the forms should be promulgated by the administering agencies; and
exemption
provisions should be modified.
The Commission endorses the

. 1 d'isc 1 osure. 45
cia

The disclosure

principle of broad

f inan-

provisions of the Ethics

Act

44 For the current standards applicable to vicarious
disqualification of firms associated with government officials,
see,~., Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility DR
5-105(D); New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 415
(1975); New York State Bar Association, Draft of the Lawyer's
Code of Professional Responsibility (October 5, 1987) at 68, 112.
45 commissioners James L. Magavern and Richard D. Emery
support a different approach to disclosure, which they believe
would prove both less intrusive upon the personal lives of state
employees and more effective in protecting the public interest.
In their view, the annual statement specified by the current
Ethics Act requires disclosure of considerable information that
will only rarely be relevant to anything the employee will ever
do in his or her state position. The form and scope of
disclosure are intimidating and may discourage people in and from
public service. Review of the form by the ethics commissions
will hardly be more than perfunctory. At the same time, the form
specified by the Act does not require information as to somewhat
more remote interests and relationships that might influence the
employee in his or her official acts. For example, a government
inspector's interest in approving conditions at a relative's
employer's establishment will not be revealed in any disclosure
statement. They believe that, instead of annual, uniform
disclosure for all covered employees, regardless of relevance to
their particular jobs, the Act should require disclosure on a
transactional basis. Before taking action in a particular matter
in which the employee (or a party related to the employee by
family or business) has an interest, the employee should be
(Footnote Continued)
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are among the most important in the entire law. 46
nonetheless recommends changes in the

The Commission

law to improve its

effec-

tiveness.

The Act provides that all government employees who earn
more than $30,000

from their government

employment must file

disclosure form unless they can show, to the satisfaction of
appropriate commission, that they
position and do
Act.

do not occupy a

not perform certain

a
the

policy-making

functions specified in

the

47

(Footnote Continued)
required to file a transactional disclosure statement identifying
that interest and relationship in reasonable detail.
Information
thus disclosed would be more relevant to a particular transaction
than any annual disclosure. It would be more difficult for the
employee to withhold or obfuscate relevant information. And, by
focussing on a particular transaction, disclosure would serve to
alert the employee, his or her associates, other parties, and the
public to potential conflicts of interest. Commissioner Magavern
is also of the view that, particularly in the case of the
Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics, the review
procedures for annual disclosure statements will be unworkable
and offensive to notions of Home Rule.
46

Ethics Act Sections 3 & 14 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law § 73-a,
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 811).
47

Ethics Act Sections 3.2(a), 7.9(k), 9.8(d). (N.Y. Pub.
Off. Law§ 73-a(2) (a); N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(k)). See also Ethics
Act Section 9.8(d) (N.Y. Legis. Law§ 80(8) (d)). Many other
individuals are also required to file statements.
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The Act thus presumes
$30,000 occupy positions of

that all employees earning

over

authority sufficient to warrant

imposition of financial disclosure requirements. It is

the

estimated

that over 65,000

government employees may be required to file
48
The consequence will very likely
forms under this provision.

be an

almost insurmountable

inadequate

enforcement

disrespect for the

of

burden of
the

paperwork, resulting

disclosure

Act's requirements among

in

requirements,

and

many employees

now

covered for no apparent purpose.

The Commission

other

states,

financial disclosure requirements be keyed to particular

policy-

making offices, rather

recommends that,

than to

disclosure is assured from
decisions,

and

neither

as in

salary levels. 49

In this

those persons actually making
the

ethics

commission

way,
policy

charged

48

with

Memorandum of Division of the Budget, July 29, 1987,
Paragraph 5. The scope of coverage is criticized in Higher
Education Services Memo, supra note 6; Tax Memo, supra note 14,
at page 2; Polhemus Letter, supra note 6; Letter of Donald E.
Urell, Counsel, New York State Executive Department Division for
Youth to Evan A. Davis (July 13, 1987); Letter of Howard A.
Fromer, Counsel, New York State Energy Office (July 16, 1987);
Letter of Raymond c. Green, General Attorney, State Insurance
Fund to Evan A. Davis (July 10, 1987); Memorandum of Jeffrey
Chamberlain, Counsel, New York State Police to Evan A. Davis
(August 3, 1987).
49

See,~., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §84-17 (1985); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 268B, §§ 1 & 3 (1987).

Report on the Ethics Act
April 6, 1988
Page 37
reviewing the disclosure forms nor the state employees
to submit them will

be unnecessarily burdened.

The

obligated
appropriate

commission, in consultation with each agency, is best equipped to
promulgate a list

of those

off ices for

which disclosure

forms

should be provided.

The Commission
actual financial
ill-advised. 50

also

believes that

disclosure forms
It creates an

ment of the forms,

in

the text

inclusion
of the

unnecessary obstacle to

since modification will require

rather than administrative, approval.
the law be

the

amended to provide

law

is

improve-

legislative,

The Commission urges

minimum disclosure

of

that

requirements,

but to allow the appropriate commission to generate the

specific

forms, in order to facilitate amendment in light of experience.

Finally, the

Act

contains two

both of which should be modified.
individuals to omit financial
forms, or to

have deleted

exemption

provisions,

First, the Act allows

information from their

certain information

disclosure

for purposes

public dissemination, if the covered individuals can

of

demonstrate

that the information has •no material bearing• on their

50

covered

official

Ethics Act Sections 3.3, 15.5 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §
73-a(3), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 812(5)).
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.

d u t 1es.

51

Second, the Act provides that actual values of

cial interests are not publicly disclosed under any
es.

finan-

circumstanc-

52

The Commission questions
exemptions.

A vague policy

the appropriateness of

these

permitting individual exceptions

to

an otherwise uniform requirement undermines public confidence and
invites suspicion
bearing•

on

even-handedly.

that the

official

standard for
duties

will

what has
not

be

a

•material
interpreted

The commissions should have the power to

suspend

or modify a reporting requirement only if they find (a) that

its

strict application works a

manifestly unreasonable hardship

and

modification will not frustrate

the

(b) that such suspension or
purposes of the law.

The exemption from public

disclosure of the values

of

financial interests is inappropriate and should be repealed.
a general proposition,
business dealings of

the greater

the role of

government officials,

secrecy in

the less

As
the

confidence

51

Ethics Act Sections 7.9(h-i), 9.8(h-i), 16.9(h-i) (N.Y.
Exec. Law§ 94(9) (h-i), N.Y . Legis. Law§ 80(8) (h-i), N.Y. Gen.
Mun. Law§ 813(9) (h-i).
52

Ethics Act Sections 7.17(a) (1), 9.16(a) (1), 16.18(a) (1)
(N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(17) (a) (1), N.Y. Legis. Law§ 80(16) (a) (1),
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813(18) (a) (1)).
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government itself can expect to inspire.

Publicly reporting

values of financial interests held by covered individuals is,
large part, the purpose

of the financial disclosure

-- it facilitates public scrutiny

in

requirement

of business interests at

with the impartial execution of public duties.

the

odds
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Conclusion

Law,
changing.

like

the

society

it

reflects,

is

constantly

It is informed by the ideals of the people who

it and it, in turn,

influences their behavior.

Nowhere is

more evident than in laws regulating ethics in government.
by enacting

rules

for

government

articulates acceptable standards of

create

officials

that

this
It is

the

public

conduct and helps to

deter-

mine the integrity of its government.

The Ethics in Government Act is an important beginning.
The public

has demanded

higher

standards from

its

government

officials and employees, and the government has begun to respond.
Some conduct previously countenanced by

law has now been

deemed

unacceptable.

The process, however, is not complete -- nor should
ever be.

it

No body of law which seeks to regulate the complexities

of conflicts in government service will ever achieve
Nonetheless, the law

should always strive

perfection.

to demand that

who hold the public trust remain worthy of it.

those

The Commission
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believes that

the

changes

urged

in

its

recommendations

essential to this endeavor.

NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION
ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY
John D. Feerick
Chairman
Richard D. Emery
Patricia M. Hynes
James L. Magavern
Bernard S. Meyer
Bishop Emerson J. Moore
Cyrus R. Vance

are
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Appendix
Summary of the Ethics Act
The Ethics Act 1 includes the following provisions:

1.

Appearances Before State Agencies
The Act prohibits statewide elected officials, state

officers and employees, and legislators and legislative employees
(collectively, "covered individuals*), as well as political party
chairmen (but not their law firms or business associates), from
making appearances or rendering services for compensation relating to matters before a state agency on behalf of private clients
in relation to: (i) the purchase, sale, rental, or lease of real
property, goods or services, or a contract therefor, involving
any such agency; (ii) rate-making proceedings; (iii) the adoption
or repeal of rules or regulations having the force of law; (iv)
obtaining grants of money or loans; (v) licensing; and (vi)
certain franchise proceedings 2• Some proceedings, including

1 Ethics in Government Act, ch. 813, 1987 N.Y. Laws 1404
(S.6441, A.8528). The Ethics Act will be codified in various
sections of New York's Public Officers Law, Executive Law,
Legislative Law, Judiciary Law, and General Municipal Law.
2 In this Report and Appendix, as in the Act, •statewide
elected officials* refers to the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Comptroller, and Attorney General. *State officers and
employees" refers to heads, deputies, assistants, officers, and
employees of state departments; officers and employees of
statewide elected officials; officers and employees of state
boards, bureaus, divisions, commissions, and councils; and
members, directors, and employees of public authorities, public
(Footnote Continued)
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certain administrative and criminal investigatory proceedings by
state agencies, are not covered by these prohibitions.

The Ethics Act, like previous law, prohibits covered
individuals (but not political party chairmen) from receiving
contingent compensation for any services rendered before a state
agency, whether or not those services fall within the six categories described above. Prohibitions on compensated appearances
against the interests of the state in the Court of Claims are
also continued.

There is no prohibition against uncompensated

appearances before state agencies or the Court of Claims, except
for post-employment appearances by state officers and employees
before their former agencies, which are entirely barred for a
period of two years after termination of government service.

The

Act specifically authorizes internal discussion and research by
covered individuals for private clients on

matters pending

before state agencies, as long as the clients are . not charged for
that discussion and research and the covered individuals do not
share in the net revenue produced by those matters.

(Footnote Continued)
benefit corporations, and commissions at least one of whose
members is appointed by the Governor. •Political party chairmen"
includes, for most purposes, individuals performing the functions
or exercising the powers of such chairmen. Ethics Act Section
2.1 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(1)). State agencies are defined to
include any of the state departments, the State University of New
York, and the City University of New York, as well as public
benefit corporations, public authorities, and commissions at
least one of whose members is appointed by the Governor. Ethics
Act Section 2.l(g) (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73(1) (g)).
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Firms, associations, or corporations connected with
present or former covered individuals (and political party
chairmen) may appear before, render services to, and transact
business with a state agency, provided that the covered individual does not share in the net revenues or •acting in good faith,
reasonably believed that he or she would not share in the net
revenues.•

A similar provision applies to appearances and

transactions by firms of covered individuals before the Court of
Claims.

The Act also contains other exceptions allowing appearances before state agencies.

Appearances involving ministerial

matters are expressly permitted.

Covered individuals may of

course act on any matter in their official capacity, and legislators and legislative employees, specifically, may act as •public
advocate[s] whether or not on behalf of a constituent.•

Individ-

uals already appearing or rendering services in a particular
matter as of January 1, 1988, are not prohibited from continuing
to do so after that date if substitution of counsel would impose
a substantial hardship on the client. 3

3

Ethics Act Sections 2.2; 2.7(a), (c), (d), & (g); 2.10; 18
(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 73(2), (7) (a), (c), (d), & (g), (10)).
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2.

Revolving Door Provisions
The Ethics Act limits former state officers and employ-

ees with respect to rendering services on behalf of private
clients before their former state agencies.

It prohibits such

appearances, whether or not for compensation, for a period of two
years dating from separation from government service.

It forever

prohibits appearances relating to matters with which the officers
and employees were directly concerned and personally involved.
Former legislators are prohibited from receiving compensation for
lobbying on any matter for two years after they leave the legislature.

There is no bar on former legislators for uncompensated

lobbying, however, and no lifetime bar.

Prohibitions are also

placed on compensated lobbying by former legislative employees,
but only for the balance of the legislative term in which they
were employed,

and then only with respect to matters with which

they were directly concerned and personally involved while
employed by the legislature. 4

3.

Sale of Goods And Services
The Ethics Act prohibits covered individuals and

certain political party chairmen (or their firms or associations,

4
Ethics Act Section 2.8 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73 (8)). With
approval of the Legislative Ethics Committee, a legislative
employee may receive compensation for performing such services if
the participation was •primarily in a supervisory capacity [and
the employee) was not personally involved in ... the matter to an
important and material degree .... • Id. See also infra page A-7.

Pg. A-5

or corporations of which these individuals own or control 10% or
more of the stock) from selling more than $25 worth of goods or
services to a state agency.

They are also prohibited from

contracting for, or providing services with or to, a private
entity when wthe power to contract, appoint or retainw on that
entity's behalf is wexercised •.. by a state agency or officer
thereof .w

There is an exception if such goods or services are

provided by competitive bidding.

Similar prohibitions are placed

upon political party chairmen in New York City with respect to
contracts with agencies within the City. 5
covered individuals are also barred from soliciting,
accepting, or receiving a gift valued at $75.00 or more if it
might reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended, or could
reasonably be expected, to influence them in the performance of
their official duties, or was •intended as a reward* for any
official action.

Offering or making such a gift is also prohib-

ited. 6

5 None, however, are placed by the Ethics Act on municipal
officials in New York City or elsewhere in New York State. The
New York City Charter does place prohibitions of this kind on New
York City employees and members of the Board of Estimate and City
Council. Section 2604(b) (1). N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 801 prohibits
certain conflicts of interest of municipal officers and
employees, with numerous exceptions codified in Section 802.
Some municipal ethics codes, adopted locally pursuant to N.Y.
Gen. Mun. Law § 806, may also contain restrictions of this kind.
See also N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 805-a.
6 Ethics Act Sections 2.4, 2.5 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law §§
73(4),(5)). N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 805-a(l), proscribing municipal
officers' receipt of gifts under •circumstances in which it could
reasonably be inferred that the gift was intended to influence•
(Footnote Continued)
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4.

Financial Disclosure Provisions
The Ethics Act imposes financial disclosure require-

ments on statewide elected officials, state officers and employees, legislators and legislative employees, judges and judiciary
branch employees, as well as on certain political party chairmen. 7

The sources of personal income, the nature of investments,

and the extent of real property holdings disclosed pursuant to
these requirements will be made public under the Ethics Act, but
the value of these disclosed items will not.

Those required to

file statements under the Act may seek an exemption from disclosure of interests having •no material bearing• on the discharge
of their official duties. 8
The Ethics Act further requires political subdivisions
(counties, cities, towns, and villages) with populations of over

(Footnote Continued)
them, was held to be unconstitutionally vague in People v. Moore,
85 Misc. 2d 4, 377 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Fulton County Ct. 1975). The
Court of Appeals, however, has not addressed the constitutionality of the statute. See also Binghamton Civil Service Forum v.
City of Binghamton, 44 N.Y.2d 23, 374 N.E.2d 380, 403 N.Y.S.2d
482 (1978).
7
under the Ethics Act, chairmen of state political party
committees and political party chairmen in counties with a
population of over 300,000 or who earn more than $30,000 are
required to file financial disclosure statements. Thus only
one-sixth of the 62 county chairmen in the State will be covered
by this provision.
8
Ethics Act Sections 3, 7.17(a) (1), 9.16(a), 16.17(a), 17.4
(N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 73-a, N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94(17) (a) (1), N.Y.
Legis. Law. § 80(16) {a), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813(17) (a), N.Y.
Jud. Law§ 211(4)). Section 2.6{a) of the Act {N.Y. Pub. Off.
Law§ 73(6) (a)) provides that all legislative employees not
covered by Section 73-a must file an abbreviated, less detailed
financial disclosure statement.
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50,000 to adopt their own financial disclosure requirements.

The

Act provides no minimum standard for these requirements, except
that New York City must adopt forms at least as stringent as
those contained in the Act.

A political subdivision that fails

to adopt such requirements by January 1, 1991, however, will be
subject to the disclosure requirements contained in the Ethics
Act. 9

Approximately 80 of the 1616 political subdivisions in New

York State, or fewer than 5%, will be required to adopt disclo.
t s un d er th'is provision.
. .
lO
sure requiremen

Enforcement Agencies

5.

The Act creates three enforcement agencies:

the State

Ethics Commission, the Legislative Ethics Committee, and the
Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics (collectively, "commissions").

The State Ethics Commission is made up of five members
appointed by the Governor.

The Attorney General and the Comp-

troller each nominate one member.

Of the remaining three mem-

bers, no more than two may be of the same political party.

At

least two members must be individuals who do not hold public

9

Ethics Act Sections 14, 15.3 (N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§§ 811,
812(3)).
10

This provision will, however, cover political subdivisions
in which the greater part of New York State's population resides.

Pg. A-8

office, and none may hold political party office or be employed
as a lobbyist.

The Legislative Ethics Committee consists of eight
members, all of whom must be legislators.

Two members are

appointed by the President pro tem of the Senate, two by the
Speaker of the Assembly, and two each by the minority leaders of
each house.

There are nine members of the Temporary State Commission on Local Government Ethics, appointed by the Governor.

The

minority and majority leaders of both houses of the Legislature
each nominate one member.

Of the remaining five members, no more

than three may be of the same political party, and at least three
must be individuals who do not hold public office.

None may hold

political party office or be employed as a lobbyist.

These commissions are charged with the task of enforcing the law's financial disclosure and conflict of interest
regulations.
al:

The major difference between them is jurisdiction-

the State Ethics Commission has jurisdiction over matters

involving statewide elected officials, candidates for these
offices, political party chairmen, and state officers and employees; the Legislative Ethics Committee exercises authority over
members of the legislature, legislative employees, and candidates
for the legislature; and the Temporary State Commission on Local
Government Ethics is concerned with the conduct of local elected
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officials, local political party officials, and local officers
and employees.

The commissions must, among other things:

adopt proce-

dures governing the filing of financial disclosure statements;
review the statements when they are filed; and determine, on
application by the filer, whether any of the information revealed
in disclosure statements may be withheld from public inspection.

Each of the ethics commissions is also authorized to
receive and investigate complaints alleging violations of the
Ethics Act.

Additionally, the commissions must render advisory

opinions on the requirements of the Ethics Act upon the request
of a person subject to the jurisdiction of the commission.

These

opinions are binding on the commissions (unless amended or
revoked) in any subsequent proceeding concerning the person who
requested the opinion, as long as that person acted in good faith
in requesting the opinion and made no omissions or misstatements
of material fact in the initial request.

The opinions may also

be relied upon as a defense in any criminal or civil action.
Requests for opinions are confidential but may be published by
the commissions as long as the name of the requesting person and
other identifying details are omitted. 11

11 Ethics Act Sections 7, 9, 16 (N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94, N.Y.
Legis. Law§ 80, N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813).
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6.

Advisory Councils
The Act establishes an advisory council for each of the

three commissions and, although there are some differences in the
manner of their appointment, they have similar duties.

Upon

application by a reporting individual, they may permit that
individual to delete information from the public copy of a
financial disclosure statement upon a showing that that information has no material bearing on the discharge of the individual's
official duties.

In addition, the councils may permit exceptions

to the filing requirement itself with respect to information
concerning the filer's family.

If a request is denied, the filer

must be informed of the right to appeal to the appropriate
•parent• commission.

In the event of a second adverse determina-

tion, the filer may institute an action against the commission
under Article 78 of New York Civil Practice Law and Rules.
Alternatively, the filer may request a 30-day period during which
all information in the application shall remain confidential.

If

the filer resigns his or her office and holds no other office
subject to the jurisdiction of the commission, the information is
not made public and is expunged.

The advisory councils may certify to the appropriate
•parent• commission certain questions which may recur or which
apply to a large number of covered individuals. 12

12
Ethics Act Sections 7.18, 9.17, 16.17 (N.Y. Exec. Law § 94
(18), N.Y. Legis. Law§ 80 (17), N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law§ 813 (17)).
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7.

Investigations and Penalties
If a commission receives a financial disclosure state-

ment indicating

a possible violation of the financial disclosure

or conflicts of interest provisions of the Ethics Act, or a sworn
complaint alleging such a violation, it must investigate.

The

commission may also decide on its own initiative to begin an
investigation.

Once an inquiry is begun, the commission must

notify the subject of the investigation of the charges and offer
a chance to submit a written reply.

In cases in which further

investigation is deemed justified, the commission must give the
subject an opportunity to be heard.

The subject of the investi-

gation must also be informed of the commission's rules regarding
adjudicatory proceedings.
confidential.

Up to this point, the investigation is

Where no violation is found, both the subject of

the investigation and the complainant must be so notified.

If

the commission determines, however, that there is reasonable
cause to believe that a violation has occurred, it must send
notice of the determination to the subject, the complainant, and,
in the case of a statewide elected official, both the President
pro tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the Assembly. 13 If the
subject is a state officer or employee, the appointing authority
must be notified.

13 In the case of senators and assemblymen, notice goes to
the President pro tem of the Senate and the Speaker of the
Assembly, respectively. In the case of a legislative employee, .
notice goes to the leader of the appropriate legislative body and
to the appointing authority.
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If a person files a deficient financial disclosure
statement, or neglects to file a statement at all, the Act
provides that the person may cure the deficiency within fifteen
days of receiving notice from the commission.

Only upon failure

to cure during this period is a notice of delinquency issued to
the appropriate authority.

Additionally, the Act seems to allow an opportunity to
•rectify• violations of the conflicts of interest laws and Code
of Ethics provisions (Public Officers Law§§ 73 and 74), by
providing that, if a commission determines that a •potential
conflict of interest violation has been rectified,• it shall so
inform the covered individual and the complainant confidentially.

The ethics commissions are deemed to be state agencies
under the state Administrative Procedure Act.

They can assess

civil penalties of up to $10,000 for knowing and intentional (or
willful) violations of the Act, or they may refer violations to
the appropriate prosecutorial agency.

They cannot do both.

Willful violations, if prosecuted, are punishable as class A
misdemeanors. 14

14
Ethics Act Sections 2.6(c), 3.4, 7.11, 7.12, 9.10, 9.11,
15.6, 16.11, 16.12, 16.13 (N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§§ 73(6) (c) &
73-a(4); N.Y. Exec. Law§ 94 (11) & (12); N.Y. Legis. Law§
80(10) & (11); N.Y. Gen . Mun. Law§§ 812(6) & 813(11), (12) &
( 13)) •
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8.

Pre-Emptive Provisions

The Ethics Act pre-empts the application of the Judiciary Law, the Education Law, and all other laws and disciplinary
rules with respect to certain conduct permitted by the terms of
the Act.

As described above, the Act also effectively prohibits

prosecution for criminal violations of the key provisions of the
Act unless and until the appropriate ethics commission formally
refers a matter to a prosecutor. 15

9.

Code of Ethics

The •code of Ethics,• codified in Section 74 of the
Public Officers Law, has not been amended in any way by the
Ethics Act.

Section 74 is a statement of ethical principles,

couched in precatory language, which sets general standards of

15
Ethics Act Sections 2.10, 2.11, 2.14, 3.4 (N.Y. Pub. Off.
Law§§ 73(10), (11) & (14), 73-a(4)).
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conduct for state agency officers or employees and legislative
members or employees. 16

16 section 74 is not a detailed proscription of conduct;
rather, it advises, among other things, that public officials
should not accept employment that will impair their independence
of judgment in the exercise of their official duties; engage in
activities that will require them to disclose or use confidential
information gained by virtue of their official position; engage
in transactions when representing the State with entities in
which they have a financial interest; or invest in enterprises
which they know could create conflicts of interest.
Additionally, full-time officers or employees of state
agencies (and firms or associations of which they are members, or
corporations in which they own or control a •substantial portion
of stock•) are counselled not to sell goods or services to any
entity licensed by the state agency by which they are employed.
State employees are also enjoined to disclose financial interests
of $10,000 or more in any activity subject to a state regulation.
Despite the precatory language of Section 74, New York
Executive Law § 74(2) (c) authorizes the promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations relating to conflicts of
interest, and knowing and intentional violation of these
standards may result in fines, suspension, or removal from
office. N.Y. Pub. Off. Law§ 74(4). See generally Nicholas v.
Kahn, 47 N.Y.2d 24, 389 N.E. 2d 1086, 416 N.Y.S. 2d 565 (1979);
Hanley v. Wickham, 32 A.D.2d 680, 299 N.Y.S.2d 745 (3d Dep't
1969).

